President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) announcement to "cease" the National Unification Council and its guidelines highlighted the US' passiveness in promoting cross-strait dialogue. Since China passed its "Anti-Secession" Law and both former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairman Lien Chan's (連戰) and People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong's (宋楚瑜) China visits, Beijing's Taiwan policy has been to isolate and marginalize Chen's government. In response, the US has repeatedly expresses its hope that China can talk to Taiwan's elected leader. Verbal statements of this sort will hardly bring China back to the negotiating table.
Looked at from Chen's perspective, if Beijing refuses to speak to him directly, any compromise or concession will only make his power base more fragile. No rational decision-maker would act in this way. As a result, the deadlock between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is expected to remain unchanged, and tension may even increase.
Clearly, Washington is the only one that can push Beijing to consider the restart of talks with Taipei. However, although Washington regards itself to be a facilitator to cross-strait talks, if it only advises Beijing orally, the effectiveness has been proven limited. From now on, Washington will need to take proactive moves to push Beijing into a dialogue with Taipei.
Chen's announcement has also underlined the necessity for the US to review its balancing role on the cross-strait issue. Washington has always defined the "status quo" in the Strait as "no independence, no war" -- based on the principle that no one shall change the "status quo" unilaterally. But its concern over the "independence" part of the equation has far outweighed its concern for "no war."
While the US and China both show concern over the perceived "gradual" or "creeping" shift towards de jure Taiwan independence, Washington has ignored the process of Beijing's "gradual annexation" or seeking of de jure unification. In the face of the growing military imbalance in the Strait, China's attempts to contain Taiwan's diplomatic space and marginalize Taiwan in regional economic cooperation, the US has failed to declare its position or counter China's threat.
US tolerance will only allow China to go further, pushing Taiwan toward being united by China or even annexed. If Taiwan does not fight back, then the "status quo" is likely to drift toward a situation unfavorable to Taiwan.
Therefore, since Washington has only had a minimal response to Beijing's "no war" pronouncements, Taipei deserves the right to draw a red line between itself and Beijing. The premise for Chen's declaration of the "four noes and one without" -- that the Chinese regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan -- is not just a matter of principle. It must be taken as an operational concept that restricts and deters China's hostile moves against Taiwan.
The cessation of the unification council and guidelines is Taiwan's declaration to the international society: We will never tolerate China's irrational threats. In short, in order to secure peace and safety in the Strait, in addition to righting the military balance, we need to pursue political deterrence.
Taiwan must also strive for the right to define and judge the "status quo," while making its bottom line clear and give itself an unassailable position.
The NUC incident was finally ended by "one cessation, with each side making its own interpretation." Through this action, Taiwan has won the right to interpret the "status quo" and to interpret what constitutes a change to the "status quo." This may well be a turning point.
-------------------------------- By Lo Chih-cheng 羅致政
Thursday, Mar 09, 2006,Page 8
Lo Chih-cheng is the executive director of the Institute for National Policy Research.
Translated by Eddy Chang
March 9, 2006
(劉孟錦律師)
